China’s UN rights review will test alignment of Global South

Uyghurs and Tibetan people demonstrate in front of the United Nations in Geneva during China’s last Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council in 2018. © Keystone / Salvatore Di Nolfi

China’s human rights record is being examined by the international community at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. Over the next two weeks, observers will be watching closely to see which states, especially from the Global South, put the spotlight on a damning 2022 UN report on alleged rights violations in China’s western Xinjiang region.

On Tuesday, China will undergo its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process whereby its human rights record is examined by other United Nations (UN) members at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The review, which takes place roughly every five years, is the only mechanism that ensures every country’s human rights performance is assessed by the international community.

During China’s UPR, from January 22 to February 2, all 193 UN member states will get a chance to share their recommendations for improvements with the Chinese authorities. However, these remain non-binding, and Beijing is free to act upon them or not.

Much has changed since Beijing’s last human rights review in 2018. Over the past five years, Beijing has faced criticism from the UN, independent experts and NGOs regarding its repressive policies in Tibet, Hong Kong and the Xinjiang region in northwest China.

“The UPR will be a key test and a temperature check of global concern around human rights issues in China, and in particular in the Uyghur region,” says Raphaël Viana David, programme manager for China and Latin America at the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), a Geneva-based NGO.

He is referring to the Muslim minority in Xinjiang, where Beijing’s repressive policies were highlighted in a much-publicised UN report published in August 2022, minutes before former UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet left office.

The report had long been delayed while Bachelet faced pressure from countries – chiefly China – opposing the report and others seeking its release. It concluded that Beijing’s treatment of the Uyghur minority could amount to “crimes against humanity”. The assessment, which Chinese diplomats argue is “illegal and invalid”, has never been formally discussed within UN bodies.

“It’s important that UN member states echo the recommendations of the report in the UPR, because this reminds the international community that it is not only important but also legitimate, as is any document issued by a UN body,” says Raphaël Viana David.

Two years ago, a group of mostly developed democracies tried to organise a debate on the report at the UN Human Rights Council. But following a tight vote, the 47-member body decided against it.

Political clout 

Some analysts believe the global context has evolved and China is looking strong as it enters its fourth UPR cycle. This allows it to silence criticism, especially from countries in the Global South that may have strong economic ties with China – for example, through the Belt and Road Initiative – and fear that confronting Beijing at the UN will hurt their bilateral ties.

“China’s power and influence has grown significantly in recent years,” says Marc Limon, executive director of Universal Rights Group (URG), a think tank in Geneva. He believes Beijing has been “winning hearts and minds” among African, Latin American and Western democracies by moving away from a “very defensive strategy” to reposition itself as “a very positive, constructive player”.

At the UN council this has meant, for example, member states dropping a resolution on colonialism, which targeted countries like France and the United Kingdom, to successfully push for a less confrontational resolution on inequality.

Meanwhile, the war in the Middle East has highlighted the double standards some Western countries apply to human rights. “There’s a great deal of anger in the Global South about this, as well as other issues such as responses to the Quran burning incidents in northern Europe,” says Limon. He adds that China looks quite strong going into the UPR, compared to its geopolitical opponents that appear “relatively weak”.

But human rights NGOs hope states will voice their concerns over the main findings of the UN Xinjiang report and make relevant recommendations.

“The Chinese government wants to portray the UPR as a process in which you either endorse the government or you confront it. But this is the wrong way to approach it. The UPR was precisely created to tackle perceived polarisation or politicisation,” says Raphaël Viana David.

The Reuters news agency reportedExternal link on January 22 that Beijing had been lobbying non-Western countries to praise its human rights record, including through memos sent to diplomats in Geneva from China’s diplomatic mission to the UN.

Can the UPR lead to change?

So, do recommendations made during a country’s UPR actually lead to specific policy changes? “If the Chinese government is unwilling to recognise that there’s a problem, it will not be a constructive player and will not implement recommendations that would lead to change,” says Raphaël Viana David.

At the end of its 2018 UPR, Beijing accepted 284 of the 346 recommendations. In his speech to the council, Le Yucheng, China’s foreign minister at the time, called the process “smooth and successful”.

But recommendations from member states are not vetted, which means countries are free to suggest any measures they want. The UPR is also an opportunity for countries to shine on the international stage.

For example, in 2018, Hungary, a country close to Beijing, declared that China “continues to protect the rights of vulnerable groups” without specifying which groups. Iran, another ally, suggested that China “safeguards its political system and the development path chosen by its own people,” echoing statements from the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

“Countries should base their recommendations on the vast array of documents that UN human rights bodies issue,” says Raphaël Viana David. “But that’s not always the case. Some countries use their political capital to mobilise other countries and sometimes to coerce them into issuing friendly recommendations.”

But under the right circumstance, if it perceives that it is lacking support on the international stage, China might feel pressure to improve its human rights policies. “This will depend on the strength of recommendations from Western governments, but also those issued from governments in the Global South,” he adds.

China’s refusal to implement recommendations could also support the notion that it does not cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. “[This] body of evidence can in turn inform the UN Human Rights Council votes on investigations in the Uyghur region and China’s suitability for membership,” Renee Xia and William Nee of the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), a Washington DC-based NGO, argue in The Diplomat.

Limon acknowledges that there are “real questions about how effective [the UPR] is today”. In earlier reviews, recommendations dealt with measures that were easier to implement. Suggestions today tend to involve changes that countries do not want to make. “The UPR is not meaningless, but increasingly when it comes to important countries like China or the US, it’s becoming a bit of a political theatre,” he adds.

Edited by Virginie Mangin