Deep freeze sets between Germany and Switzerland

Alain Berset and Olaf Scholz at a press conference in April 2023 in Berlin. © Keystone / Anthony Anex

Germany is in the process of redefining its relations with Switzerland. The rapport between the two neighbours has worsened rapidly. The situation also represents a sharp prod from Brussels. An analysis.

The ambience exudes a formal cosiness, with coffee and orange juice, bread rolls, and flowers in red and white, the Swiss national colours. But the timing betrays a certain urgency, or rather tension.

It’s May 3. Berlin. An early morning meeting behind closed doors, shoehorned in between tight agendas. Only two weeks after Alain Berset, who holds the rotating Swiss presidency this year, made an official visit to Germany, Livia Leu, the Swiss state secretary in the foreign department, also flew to Berlin. Her mission? “Current bilateral topics,” as she announced on Twitter.

During the breakfast Andreas Michaelis, state secretary in the German Foreign Office, told his Swiss counterpart: “The Swiss-EU relationship plays a core role in how we define our relations with Switzerland.”

Paul Seger, the Swiss ambassador in Berlin, attended the meeting. He paraphrases Michaelis’s sentiments like this: “The Germans are definitely keeping a close eye on how our dealings with the EU develop so as to then define how our bilateral relations evolve.”

This can also be expressed more bluntly: Germany is turning its back on Switzerland.

The EU is closing ranks, meaning the powerful neighbour is gravitating towards Brussels. It’s leaving Switzerland to drift perilously onto the rocks. This is nothing less than a disaster for Switzerland.

“The Swiss government completely underestimates European unity,” says Eric Nussbaumer, a member of the left-wing Social Democratic Party who sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swiss House of Representatives. The pandemic, war and Brexit have all reinforced a sense of European cohesion, he says. Meanwhile, Switzerland has staked its political fortunes in particular on Germany.

A failed door-to-door strategy 

Since 2021 at the latest Switzerland has invested considerable energy in pursuing a barely communicated but clearly recognisable European strategy: broad, unilateral lobbying – also known as going from door to door.

The German delegation with State Secretary Michaelis (far left) at breakfast with Swiss delegation. On the right side of the table State Secretary Livia Leu and Ambassador Paul Seger (with bow tie). Twitter: @SwissMFAStatSec

This involved more than 50 ministerial meetings in 2021 alone. Its goal is to recruit as many powerful supporters as possible to drum up understanding and patience in Brussels for Switzerland’s “special path”.

Initially the strategy seemed to work. A year ago the Swiss ambassador in Berlin described Germany as “one of our best friends in Brussels”.

Following Switzerland’s unilateral rejection of a framework agreement with the EU in May 2021, Swiss tactics have focused on conciliation. Bern is perfectly aware of the ill feeling in Brussels and of practically European-wide incomprehension about the move.

Nevertheless, this path is littered with obstacles.

First of all Switzerland lost France. In June 2021 the Swiss government decided in favour of buying US fighter jets, rejecting a bid by the French manufacturer Dassault Rafale. This proved to be a nail in the coffin of the Swiss charm offensive at a point when France had promised to lobby on Switzerland’s behalf if the Swiss bought from the French.

As a result, France then cancelled a meeting between President Emmanuel Macron with his Swiss counterpart, with the French ambassador to Switzerland openly declaring: “We have a problem”.External link External link

Switzerland snubs everyone

Then everything collapsed. Russia attacked Ukraine, while Switzerland managed to generate new, deeper and widespread irritation.

First of all the EU had to apply pressure that Switzerland even joined their sanctions, with Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, being forced to personally pick up the phone ten days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Then Switzerland caused a stir by being slow to impose the sanctions, only to then cause even more upset by digging in its heels when EU states began supplying weapons to Ukraine.

Good conversation with Swiss President @ignaziocassisExternal link regarding the unprovoked attack of Russia on Ukraine.

I welcome the decision of the Swiss government to widen sanctions against Russia in step with the measures imposed by the EU. pic.twitter.com/BtLoPBHeKkExternal link

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) March 4, 2022External link

In practical terms, the European states required Swiss consent in order to pass on Swiss weapons to Ukraine. As with implementing the sanctions, Switzerland came under pressure a second time. But it responded cagily by repeatedly referring to Swiss laws and Swiss neutrality – and then promptly did a U-turn. Defence Minister Viola Amherd was obliged to inform the domestic pressExternal link that “there is no understanding in Europe for the ban on the re-export of arms”.  

And so relations with Germany began to freeze over, with 96 mothballed, Swiss-owned Leopard 2 combat tanks as the main bone of contention, left to rust in Switzerland while Germany pushed to buy them back. They were meant for their own military requirements – deliveries to Ukraine had depleted the German stocks – but Switzerland’s response was a “no”.

Good cop, bad cop

An intermezzo: in mid-March 2023 Maros Sefcovic, a vice-president of the European Commission, visited Switzerland. It was a well-intentioned appearance – a sincerity that no one in the Alpine state had expected. The man responsible for Switzerland in Brussels was unhurried: he listened, showed understanding, cracked jokes.

Swiss Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis welcomed Maros Sefcovic, Vice-President of the European Commission, during a working visit in Bern in March. © Keystone / Peter Schneider

Why suddenly so accommodating? This was, after all, the man who previously had strong-armed Switzerland with ultimatums and obvious indifference. Until then he had tabled seven rounds of exploratory talks with the chief Swiss negotiator Livia Leu – all of them in side offices, with his staff; he himself rarely had the time. 

Now, in Switzerland in person, he was full of praise for Swiss sensibilities, expressed his desire for rapprochement and radiated an infectious optimism. The Swiss politicians who met him were charmed, speaking of a “new atmosphere”, an “awakening”. Brussels was on its best behaviour as the good cop.

A month later, on April 18, it was Berset’s turn to visit German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Tanks, ammunition, Ukraine? Berset refused to move, again citing Swiss neutrality. “No” remained “no”. Scholz said they had taken note of the decisions made so far and hoped some movement occurred. It didn’t sound as though he believed it would.

But Scholz had to deliver. Everyone knew that Germany was also under pressure. In terms of Ukraine, it was the US setting the agenda, and what the US wanted to happen was perfectly clear to every country in Europe.

Prods from the EU

After that, Germany became decidedly disgruntled. Over breakfast, with the bouquets in Swiss national colours, it informed its smaller neighbour that it was redefining their relations.

This is not just about German frustration. It’s also a sharp prod from the European Union, with Brussels now playing the bad cop.

A week later, on May 10, Leu threw in the towel. The chief Swiss negotiator with the EU is moving to the embassy in Berlin. Not exactly a cosy retreat – more like more of the same, considering the feeling of tension there.

Keeping their distance? Swiss President Alain Berset and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin in April. © Keystone / Anthony Anex